By Johannes Roessler, Naomi Eilan

ISBN-10: 0199245622

ISBN-13: 9780199245628

Lately there was a lot mental and neurological paintings purporting to teach that cognizance and self-awareness play no function in inflicting activities, and certainly to illustrate that unfastened will is an phantasm. The essays during this quantity topic the assumptions that encourage such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The publication might be obligatory examining for psychologists and philosophers engaged on motion clarification, and for someone attracted to the relation among the mind sciences and realization.

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Extra resources for Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Consciousness and Self-Consciousness)

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1957), Intention. Oxford: Blackwell. BREWER, B. (1999), Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CAMPBELL, 1. (1993), 'The role of physical objects in spatial thinking', In N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, and B. ), Spatial Representation. Oxford: Blackwell. , and PAILLARD, J. (1995), 'Living without touch and peripheral information about body position and movement: studies with deafferented subjects', in J. Bermudez, A. Marcel, and N. : MIT Press. DAVIES, M. (2000), 'Persons and their underpinnings'.

Where does this leave the claim that awareness of ownership of actions is a case of immersed self-awareness? There are a number of options. One would be to hold on to Marcel's claim that the self figures only implicitly, and argue that this may be sufficient for a causal sense of ownership. Consider the case of young infants' enjoyment of controlling interesting effects, mentioned in Section 4 above (for extended discussion see Chapter 13 by Michael Lewis). Infants' emotional reactions to interesting effects under their control seem to demonstrate some kind of awareness of controlling things; yet, intuitively a sense of control of this kind does not require an explicit representation of the self as the agent of an action.

A defence of the idea that perception of affordances can be conscious would involve insisting, inter alia that dispositions can, contra Campbell, be the objects of direct conscious experience, and this is what is experienced in the case of habitual actions. Why should we be interested in pursuing this line of thought? One of many reasons can be brought out as follows. On Campbell's account, consciousness comes in only for the sake of theoretical understanding and reasoning. This, in turn, explains what is distinctive about intentional action: it is informed by such reasoning.

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Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Consciousness and Self-Consciousness) by Johannes Roessler, Naomi Eilan

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