By Paul Eric Teske
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Additional info for After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation
Therefore, in the quantitative analysis, I will compare onestage regression results with twostage results that treat appropriate institutional factors as endogenous, to perform this test. Thus, institutions can be seen as a mix of interest group coalitions summed over time, with lagging influence, but which develop interests and capabilities of their own. Skowroneck (1982) Page 23 and other political scientists recently have devoted substantial attention to the development of administrative capabilities in American governmental institutions.
The revenue shortfall can be made up by increased usage rates. Most empirical studies of LMS have shown this to be true (Crew and Dansby, 1983; Bell Communications Research 1984; although Johnson and Park, 1986 suggest otherwise, depending on local characteristics). The proper economic methodology for recovery of these costs is by Ramsey pricing. Some economists suggest that in practice, the Ramsey price adjustment to cover common telephone costs would roughly offset the downward adjustment in access prices to account for the network externalities (Ordover and Willig, 1983; Perl, 1985).
Much controversy has centered on whether interest group pressure comes from a variety of sources, in a pluralist fashion, or whether a few powerful groups continually dominate outcomes. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, clearly was not captured by AT&T in the 1970s. AT&T did advance the regulated monopoly concept in the early part of this century (Brock, 1981), but the theory of complete business exploitation of the regulatory process is no longer relevant in telecommunications or most other industries today.
After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation by Paul Eric Teske